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1955] COMMENTS 451 
REAL PROPERTY - COMPENSATION FOR ABROGATION OF A RE-
STRICTIVE CoVENANT BY PUBLIC AuTHORITY-Probably the two most 
effective legal devices for controlling the use of land, at least for the 
purpose of establishing an area which may be developed only with 
single family dwellings, are the restrictive covenant and the zoning 
ordinance. One, the restrictive covenant, depends upon the volition 
of private individuals. Since the historic case of Tulk 11. Moxhay,1 
holding that a negative restrictive covenant might be enforced against 
a successor of the covenantor who took with notice of the restriction, 
it has been used extensively to effectuate the creation of restricted resi-
dential areas. The other method, the zoning ordinance, is imposed by 
organized society acting through appropriate governmental ~hannels. 
The use of this device has become extremely common during the past 
thirty years, the most noteworthy growth coming after the Supreme 
Court upheld the general constitutionality of a comprehensive zoning 
ordinance. 2 
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the legal consequences 
produced when the tranquillity of the residential district is disturbed 
by governmental action. Sometimes the disturbance arises when a gov-
ernmental unit simply amends a zoning ordinance to permit a less 
restricted use; sometimes the power of eminent domain is exercised 
and the land thus acquired is used for a purpose which does not con-
form to the previously existing restrictions. In either case, there fre-
quently are persons who, having relied upon the restrictions, are sub-
jected to the loss of values which they anticipated from the restricted 
character of the neighborhood. This loss can be the result of four 
possible variations arising from these two methods of governmental 
interference. First, there is the effect of condemnation of land which 
12 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). 
2 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). 
452 MICHIGAN LAw REvrnw [ Vol. 53 
is subject to a restrictive covenant and subsequent use of that land in 
a manner which deprived the covenantee of any benefit from the restric-
tive covenant. In this area we are particularly concerned with com-
pensation to the beneficiaries of the restrictive covenant. The major 
portion of the comment will be devoted to this phase. Second, there 
is the effect of condemnation of land followed by a non-conforming 
public use which does not coincide with the restrictions already imposed 
by a zoning ordinance. This area gives little difficulty.3 Third, there 
is the effect of amendment of a zoning ordinance upon restrictions 
previously imposed by the zoning ordinance. Here again the law is 
relatively well settled. Fourth, there is the effect of amendment of a 
zoning ordinance on private restrictive covenants. The ramifications 
of this area are worthy of consideration at some length. 
Since the Constitution of the United States requires the govern-
ment to compensate for any property it takes, it is very important to 
determine whether or not the damage done to those who suffer economic 
loss is to be classified as a taking of "property" within the constitutional 
definition. Although there is little disagreement that a piece of land 
is "property," there is room for reasonable difference of opinion when 
the item in question is the benefit from a restrictive covenant. In such 
a fringe area a proper decision can be made only by looking beyond a 
preconceived categorization of private interests involving land. More-
over, once a certain fringe interest is found to constitute "property," 
the concept of stare decisis should be applied only when a previous 
decision deals with an interest that is strikingly similar to the one at 
hand. It might be well if decisions in this area were to rest on the 
underlying policy considerations that originally were used in deciding 
that land was "property." However, courts usually follow the rather 
unrealistic approach of trying to fit their holdings into traditional defini-
tions of property, and their decisions must be discussed with this in 
mind. 
I. The Effect of Condemnation upon Restrictive Covenants 
A. Restrictive Covenants as Property. Whereas the enforcement 
of a written covenant was a bold step in Tulk v. Moxhay, it is not now 
unusual for courts of equity to infer the equivalent of a restrictive 
3 There is little difficulty in deciding that the condemning authority need not com-
pensate for disappointing those who relied on the zoning ordinance as it stood. There may 
be some difficulty in determining the applicability of zoning ordinances to other govern-
mental agencies, however. 
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covenant in certain situations.4 A written restrictive covenant, being 
generally enforceable in courts of law, has often been denominated 
a "property right."5 There is, however, at least one situation in which 
such a covenant is not universally found to be "property": when land 
is condemned while subject to a restrictive covenant in favor of adjacent 
land. This situation is presented in its most common form when a 
residential subdivision is planned and each lot is sold with an express 
covenant that the lot may be used "for residential purposes only."6 
Some years later the city condemns several of the lots for a public 
project, and the neighboring home owners sue for compensation for 
the loss of the benefit of the covenant. The crucial question is ·whether, 
because of constitutional mandate, the covenantee should be compen-
sated for the financial injury he sustains. There are competing policy 
considerations which make the choice far from easy. On the one hand 
is the fact that something of value has been taken from the covenantee. 
On the other hand is the fact that any damage done is only incidental 
to the furtherance of public purposes. 
The courts are about equally divided on this question of compen-
sation for depriving the covenantee of the benefit of the restrictive 
covenant.7 Michigan is a strong advocate of the "property" view,8 as 
shown by the leading case of Allen v. Detroit.9 In its opinion the court 
held that restrictive covenants are easements at law, and that the plain-
tiff's interest must be purchased or condemned with full compensation. 
The court used the following language: 
"Building restrictions are private property, an interest in real 
estate in the nature of an easement, go with the land, and are a 
property right of value, which cannot be taken for public use 
4 See Walsh, "Equitable Easements and Restrictions," 2 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 234 
(1930), for a discussion of the evolution of the restrictive covenant. 
5Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917); 
Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890). 
6 Walsh, ''Equitable Easements and Restrictions," 2 Romcr MT. L. REv. 234 at 237 
(1930). 
7 Cases illustrative of the view that restrictive covenants give rise to property interests 
which must be compensated in condemnation proceedings include: Meagher v. Appalachian 
Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E. (2d) 461 (1953); Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 
198, 7 S. (2d) 708 (1942); Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 A. 245 (1928); 
Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024 (1921); Flynn v. New York, W. & B. Ry. 
Co., 218 N.Y. 140, 112 N.E. 913 (1916). Cases declaring that restrictive covenants con-
stitute only equitable rights include: Friesen v. Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 
(1930); Doan v. The Cleveland Short Line Ry. Co., 92 Ohio St. 461, 112 N.E. 505 
(1915); Moses v. Hazen, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 842; Ward v. The Cleveland Ry. 
Co., 92 Ohio St. 471, 112 N.E. 507 (1915). 
s Johnstone v. Detroit, G.H. & M. Ry. Co., 245 Mich. 65, 222 N.W. 325 (1928); 
Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911) are the leading Michigan cases. 
o 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911). • 
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without due process of law and compensation therefor; the validity 
of such restriction not being affected by the character of the parties 
in interest.'110 
It can be forcefully argued that the loss of the residential character 
of a neighborhood is a very real one, and that the condemning authority 
must pay for the loss of "property" through reduced value just as it paid 
the fair value of the lots actually taken.11 It is this rule that the English 
courts have followed,1 2 and this writer believes it to be the better view. 
It gives effect to the strong policy argument that the benefit of an 
agreement made by private initiative, as distinguished from a right 
created by government action, should not be abrogated without com-
pensation. It seems only proper that public authority should not be 
able to deprive landowners of rights created by private individuals as 
easily as "rights" created by that very public authority. 
B. Restrictive Covenants as Equitable Interests. Many jurisdic-
tions do not accept the above analysis, but declare that a restrictive 
covenant is only an equitable right, and the covenantee is not entitled 
to any compensation when the covenantor's land is condemned. Per-
haps the leading case supporting this view is United States v. Certain 
Lands.13 The United States Government sought to condemn residential 
lands near the Pacific Ocean for defense purposes. Owners of nearby 
properties objected, claiming that the United States would violate their 
restrictive covenants by its prospective actions. The decision in favor 
of the government was based on two grounds: the restrictive language 
was not violated, and restrictive covenants are not true easements. The 
court was also concerned with the possible future effect on eminent 
domain proceedings, and said: 
"If such a right can exist against the state or nation, and can 
be considered property, then only a mere device of conveyancing 
is necessary to defeat entirely the rule that depreciation of property 
incidental to a public use does not constitute a 'taking'; for private 
deeds may then provide in express terms against such uses as may 
be necessary in case the government exercises the right of eminent 
d • "14 omam. 
10 Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich. 464 at 473, 133 N.W. 317 (1911). 
11 For the argument that the cost of a condemnation should be absorbed by the citizens 
in general rather than by just a few, see Aigler, ''Measure of Compensation for Extinguish-
ment of Easement by Condemnation," 1945 W1s. L. RBv. 5 at 34. 
12 The outstanding English case is The Long Eaton Recreation Grounds Co. v. The 
Midland Ry. Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 574. 
1s (1st Cir. 1899) 112 F. 622. 
14 Id. at 629. The argument of the court may be answered by saying that "mere con-
veyancing" often makes compensation necessary, notably in the instance of condemnation 
of land which is subject to an easement of way. 
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It is of interest to note the observation made by one eminent 
writer,1 5 who points out that the portion of United States v. Certain 
Lands upon which many courts rely as precedent is really nothing more 
than dictum.16 There can be no doubt that he is correct. The only 
basis necessary for the decision was that the government project would 
not violate the restrictive covenant, for this alone shows that the gov-
ernment was not liable. The additional reason, that no compensation 
would be necessary even if the covenant were to be violated at some 
indefinite time in the future, seems superfluous, as it does in many 
other restrictive covenant cases using the same technique. 
Perhaps the major concern of the non-compensating courts is the 
possibility of a multiplicity of claims.17 They fear that in order to 
block a specific governmental project all the property owners in the 
vicinity will ask for compensation, causing a prohibitive expense. 
Actually there is little to fear, because only those home owners living 
near the condemned area will sustain real damage, and the courts are 
well qualified to differentiate between real and feigned injury. It is 
often possible that a substantial gain will result to those on the fringe 
of the area concerned. For example, if a small bus waiting station 
were built on a condemned lot, the value of real estate in the immediate 
area might drop, but the value of land a block away would probably 
rise, for bus service would now be available as an added convenience. 
Of course, the introduction of a railroad terminal would increase the 
perimeter of claimants, but the courts will still be able to make the 
proper evaluation of claims.18 
The courts which refuse compensation adhere to the idea that the 
public good is supreme, even when privately created rights are abro-
gated. They say, in effect, that the government may disturb the tran-
quillity of the residential district whether that condition was brought 
about by public or private action, paying only for the land actually 
taken. 
C. Avoidance by Interpretation. Numerous courts have avoided 
the crucial question or given their decision additional support by inter-
15 Aigler, "Measure of Compensation for Extinguishment of Easement by Condemna-
tion," 1945 Wis. L. R:Ev. 5. 
16 An examination of the court's exact language would be helpful. See United States 
v. Certain Lands, (1st Cir. 1899) 112 F. 622 at 626. 
17 This argument is analyzed in 38 MicH. L. R:Ev. 357 (1940); and Aigler, ''Measure 
of Compensation for Extinguishment of Easement by Condemnation," 1945 Wis. L. R:Ev. 
5 at 32. 
18 Perhaps no group is as well qualifiea to deal with the uncertain as are the courts, 
for they must do so every day. 
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preting the restrictive covenants as not prohibiting the use in question,1 9 
or as not applying to public authorities.20 Too often the interpretations 
have been rather strained in order to achieve the desired result-denial 
of a right to compensation. A good example is Moses v. Hazen,21 where 
the language, "shall be built and used for residence purposes exclu-
sively,"22 was construed to allow a school building. This court, as 
have· many others, twisted the meaning of words to avoid the basic 
question. This course is even less commendable than merely labeling 
a restrictive covenant as "a right only in equity." It avoids the con-
tradictions that occur when a jurisdiction holds that a restrictive cove-
nant does not create property rights when there is a condemnation of 
the servient tenement, but creates contradictions in other instances.23 
Whatever the method used, the underlying policy question, whether 
the individual should suffer the loss or the public should pay, remains 
hidden beneath a covering of legal terminology. 
IL Effect of Amendment of Zoning Ordinances on 
Restrictive Covenants 
A situation somewhat similar to the deprivation of benefit of a 
restrictive covenant by condemnation of the servient tenement arises 
when a city zones a district for residential use and later amends the 
ordinance to allow industrial or business use, thereby causing a drop 
in value of residential properties in the area.24 The law is well settled 
when the amendment of a zoning ordinance merely abrogates "rights" 
acquired from the previous zoning law. Courts will protect the resi-
dential owner to this extent: they require that the exercise of police 
power conform to the same standard as that exercised in the passage of 
the original ordinance,25 that is, the amendment must be reasonably 
necessary to the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, or other 
exercise of the police power.26 Suppose, however, that the area is not 
19 Friesen v. Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930); Moses v. Hazen, (D.C. 
Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 842; Wharton v. United States, (1st Cir. 1907) 153 F. 876. 
20 United States v. Certain Lands, (1st Cir. 1899) 112 F. 622. 
21 (D.C. Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 842. 
22 Id. at 843. 
23 Compare Miller v. Babb, (Tex. Comm. App. 1924) 263 S.W. 253, with Houston 
v. Wynne, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 279 S.W. 916; and Martin v. Holm, 197 Cal. 733, 
242 P. 718 (1925), with Friesen v. Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930). 
24 For amplification of the legal aspects of such a situation, see 25 low A L. REv. 830 
(1940); 41 H.mv. L. REv. 667 (1928); 8 UNIV. PnT. L. REv. 69 (1941). 
25 Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E. (2d) 993 
(1938); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, 408 ID. 91, 96 N.E. (2d) 499 (1951). 
26 Hasbrouck Heights Hospital Assn. v. Hasbrouck Heights, 27 N.J. Super. 476, 99 A. 
(2d) 591 (1953); Rodgers v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E. (2d) 731 (1951). 
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only zoned for a particular use, but that there are also private restric-
tive covenants which limit the use. Suppose further that the zoning 
law is now amended so as to impose further restrictions. The applicable 
law changes slightly. An unreasonable amendment will still be declared 
invalid, and one which is reasonable will be allowed to place a greater 
restriction on an area than was the case under a set of private negative 
restrictive covenants already in existence. Thus, while the applicable 
covenants would allow residences and apartments, an area may never-
theless be effectively zoned for residential use only. It seems logical 
that the exercise of police power should be able to limit further the use 
to which land is put when there is already a restrictive covenant 
attached, just as it can limit the use of land that is completely free of 
prior restrictions. The restrictive covenant is in no way violated, for 
the restrictions it prescribes are still in force. 
A more difficult question arises when the uses permitted by an 
amendment are less restrictive than a pre-existing private covenant. The 
courts have almost invariably held that an amendment of a zoning 
ordinance which lifts governmentally imposed restrictions does not 
indicate legislative intent to nullify a more stringent private covenant. 
Most of these cases say that an amendment to a zoning ordinance 
cannot abrogate a more restrictive private covenant. 27 There is, how-
ever, one recent case in which the court reached a contrary conclusion. 28 
This decision assumes considerable importance, in view of the fact that 
most of the cases in which it is said that an amendment to the ordinance 
cannot abrogate more restrictive private covenants are explainable on 
the ground that the amendment did not purport to do so. If an amend-
ment evidences a plain intention to override the applicable private 
covenants, the courts could deviate from their present position and still 
maintain logical consistency. However, it seems doubtful that they 
would do so, for the language used by the courts, though technically 
dictum as applied to this situation, is certainly broad enough to cover 
it.29 
In deciding zoning questions the courts seem to realize that they 
are actually dealing with a compromise between collective and indi-
vidual rights. The decisions rest on basic considerations rather than 
upon definitions and are consistent with the principle of allowing a 
21 Abrams v. Shuger, 336 Mich. 59, 57 N.W. (2d) 445 (1953); Olberding v. Smith, 
(Ohio App. 1934) 34 N.E. (2d) 296; Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257 Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 
884 (1926); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. (2d) 704 (1943). 
28 Taylor v. Hackensack, 137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A. (2d) 788 (1948). 
29 For a favorable discussion of Taylor v. Hackensack and the possibilities it suggests, 
see 48 MICH. L. R:Bv. 103 (1949). 
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government extensive freedom in withdrawing "rights" which it had 
earlier conferred on individuals. 
III. The Minnesota Zoning System 
Thus far, we have been concerned with the compensable status of 
rights created either exclusively by private action or exclusively by 
governmental action. A unique system obtains in Minnesota, where 
rights are created by the combined action of individuals and the gov-
ernmental unit concerned. Instead of having zones planned exclu-
sively by a commission, zoning laws are passed by a two-thirds vote of 
the city council, upon petition of fifty percent of the property owners 
in the district.30 After the council has passed the suggested measure, 
an eminent domain proceeding is conducted to establish the district. 31 
Awards are made for damages to those put in a less favorable position, 
and assessments are levied on those who benefit. Under the statute the 
removal of restrictions is made in the same manner.32 In the very sig-
nificant case of Burger v. City of St. Paul,33 the plaintiff and defendant 
were both property owners in a restricted residential district, estab-
lished by condemnation under the original 1915 zoning law.34 De-
fendant secured a permit to remodel his house into a fourplex pursuant 
to a 1943 amendment to the original act.3" Plaintiff requested that the 
building permit be declared void, and that the remodeling be enjoined. 
The district court held for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota it was held that an interest which constitutes "prop-
erty"-the court called it an "easement"36-had been created by the 
30 Compare the Ohio law. "The planning commission . . . may frame and adopt a 
plan for dividing the municipal corporation or any portion thereof into zones or districts, 
representing the recommendations of the commission, in the interest of the public health, 
safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general welfare, for the limitations and regulation 
of the height, bulk, and location, including percentage of lot occupancy, set back building 
lines, and area and dimension of yards, courts, and other open spaces, and uses of buildings 
and other structures and of premises in such zones or districts." Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 
1953) §713.06. "The legislative authority of such municipal corporation may amend or 
change the number, shape, area, or regulations of or within any district. ... " Id., §713.10. 
31 "The council shall first, after causing the probable costs of the proceedings, if 
abandoned, to be deposited or secured by the petitioners, designate the restricted residence 
district and shall have power to acquire by eminent domain the right to exercise the power 
granted by sections 462.12 to 462.17 by proceedings hereinafter defined, and when such 
proceedings shall have been completed, the right to exercise such powers shall be vested 
in the city." Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §462.13. 
32Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §462.12. 
33 (Minn. 1954) 64 N.W. (2d) 73. 
34 Minn. Laws (1915) c. 128. 
85 Minn. Laws (1943) c. 246. 
36 Frequent use by courts of the word "easement" in this situation is illustrative of 
the desire to give a well-recognized name to a newer type of interest. 
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original condemnation, and hence it could not be taken without just 
compensation. The court's reasoning is illustrated by the following: 
"It seems to us that the situation created in the restricted use 
area here under condemnation proceedings is similar to the situa-
tion where a common grantor opens up a tract of land to be sold in 
lots and blocks and, before any lots are sold, inaugurates a general 
plan for such entire subdivision intending thereby to increase the 
value of each lot and then sells each lot subject to such plan of 
improvement. As a result there is thereby created and annexed 
to the entire tract restrictive covenants. . . ."37 
The Minnesota court has extended the idea of "property" to a 
restrictive covenant which it implies from the fact that the plaintiff's 
property was zoned as residential under the original 1915 law. The 
result of carrying this theory to its logical extreme would be that when 
the legislature passes a zoning statute upon which people rely, there is 
no power to change that statute. This result would conllict with the 
general and extensive power of a legislature to amend its laws. 
This writer believes that the Minnesota court could have found 
better justification for its decision. If the court had applied the usual 
requirement that an amendment to a zoning law must be based upon 
the furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, and general wel-
fare, the amendment could have been declared invalid, since the court 
seemed to feel that defendant's actions did nothing to further the public 
good.38 The case also fits well into the "privately created rights" pat-
tern. Under the Minnesota law the neighboring property owners ini-
tiate zoning restrictions by a petition signed by fifty percent of the 
property owners in the district. Without individual action there could 
be no zoning restrictions in the first place. Governmental action alone 
is not sufficient, so the Minnesota law is more than an ordinary zoning 
law, which operates solely through public authority. Since the original 
"zoning" restrictions are in this sense privately created, it is not illogical 
to hold that the government must compensate affected property owners 
for any changes it makes in the status quo. In addition, according to 
the Minnesota law the property owners in the area concerned had to 
pay for their benefits under the original zoning ordinance.39 A subse-
quent deprivation of such benefits without compensation would hardly 
be in accord with ordinary concepts of justice. 
37 Burger v. City of St. Paul, (Minn. 1954) 64 N.W. (2d) 73 at 81. 
asJd. at 82. 
39 Minn. Laws (1915) c. 128. .-.• ' 
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Earlier in the comment it was mentioned that an amendment to a 
zoning ordinance is valid only if it furthers the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare, but that if it does so, property owners gen-
erally have no claim for the depreciation in their property values.40 
The deciding factor is the public interest; when exercised reasonably, 
the rights of adjacent landowners must bow to it.41 It appears that even 
under the Minnesota law a restrictive covenant implied because of a 
condemnation proceeding might fall without compensation if the public 
good really demanded it.42 The court in the Burger case is very careful 
to point out that zoning procedure in Minnesota is not the exercise of 
police power only, but that because of the statute the proceeding is of 
a mixed nature-one of both police power and eminent domain.43 
However, one gets the impression that if the public need were really 
great, it could override the theory of implied restrictive covenants and 
compensation would not be required.44 It is only fitting that an over-
whelming public need should supersede these benefits even though 
they were partially the result of individual action. 
IV. A Suggested Change in Approach 
It has been pointed out that there is a definite split among the 
courts on the matter of required compensation to a restrictive cove-
nantee when the government uses the condemned property in a manner 
which deprives the covenantee of the benefit of the covenant. The 
better view is that there should be compensation. Other cases declare 
40 A leading case so holding is Eggebeen v. Sonnenbw:g, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W. (2d) 
84 (1941). 
41 Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 18 A. (2d) 856 (1941); Page v. 
Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P. (2d) 280 (1946). For a discussion of what constitutes 
public good today, see 8 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS, 3d ed., §25 (1950). 
42 The court seems dissatisfied with the profit element in the case, as shown by the 
following quotation: ''Who suggested converting the property at 669 Summit avenue into 
a fourplex property? The evidence in this case does not disclose a public request. What 
justification is there for the exercise of the police power to assist a single individual's 
ventw:e for profit?" Burger v. City of St. Paul, (Minn. 1954) 64 N.W. (2d) 73 at 82. 
43 ''If a governmental subdivision were exercising the police power, without more, the 
case would be one of uncompensated duty of submission. The statute governing this pro-
cedure requires compensation to all who suffer damages. Therefore, it is of no consequence 
that there may be an element of police power activity in the proceeding for invoked also 
are the powers of taxation and eminent domain." Burger v. City of St. Paul, (Minn. 1954) 
64 N.W. (2d) 73 at 77. 
44 The following excerpt seems to show the attitude of the cow:t: "No further 
authorities need be cited to establish that under the circumstances before us any act which 
deprives a citizen of his property rights cannot be sustained under the police power unless 
the public health, morals, comfort, or welfare demands that such power be exercised or 
that such laws or ordinances be enacted." Burger v. City of St. Paul, (Minn. 1954) 64 
N.W. (2d) 73 at 82. 
1955] COMMENTS 461 
that restrictive covenants are merely rights cognizable in equity; hence 
the covenantee is not given compensation. A third group of cases 
depends upon intellectual gymnastics of interpretation to avoid the 
whole issue. It is the consensus that a zoning ordinance may make an 
area more selective than the already applicable private covenants, but 
that mere enactment of a zoning ordinance cannot make an area less 
restricted. The sway of a reasonable zoning amendment is unlimited 
when there are no restrictive covenants applicable. It is also true that 
the government need not compensate surrounding owners when it 
condemns property for a use not sanctioned by the zoning ordinance. 
The conB.ict in decisions giving and refusing compensation to a 
restrictive covenantee who is deprived of the benefit of the covenant 
may be avoided by the use of a "privately created rights" test. The test 
is derived from the law in the other three situations mentioned. It may 
be stated as follows: the government should be compelled to compen-
sate for its deprivation of any benefits which arise from individual, as 
opposed to governmental, action. The test is illustrated by the wealth 
of decisions holding that the government should not be able to abrogate 
a restrictive covenant by enacting or amending the applicable zoning 
laws, but that it should be able to increase the degree of restriction over 
that privately imposed. It is further illustrated by holdings that mere 
amendment of an existing zoning ordinance does not require that com-
pensation be given to those injured thereby, and that the government 
can use land obtained through eminent domain without regard to the 
zoning ordinance. No restrictions created by individual action are vio-
lated in either case. This same theory leads to the conclusion that the 
beneficiary of a restrictive covenant should receive compensation when 
the government exercises its unquestioned right to use the covenantor's 
land in a way not sanctioned by the covenant. The theory justifies the 
decisions of courts following the "property" view. 
Throughout this comment two theories have been advanced. First, 
the decisions in the four classes of cases mentioned in the introduction 
can be reconciled on the theory that public authority may deprive 
people of the benefits of "rights" that are created by the government 
with greater ease than rights are created by private initiative. Only 
when there is an overwhelming public interest should the government 
be allowed to abrogate privately created rights without compensation. 
Second, that whatever the view of a court may be on the :first theory, 
its decision should be based upon underlying policy reasons rather than 
upon a process of molding the elements of a case to :fit the definition 
that will give the desired result. Since the basic consideration in cases 
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allowing a deprivation of the benefit of a restrictive covenant without 
.compensation is in reality the supremacy of ordinary public interest over 
individual "rights," the courts should say so. 
Howard N. Thiele, Jr., S.Ed. 
